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This article is cited in 6 scientific papers (total in 6 papers)
An Effective Punishment for an n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network
A. L. Grinikh, L. A. Petrosyan Saint Petersburg State University
Abstract:
The paper considers an n-person prisoner's dilemma game. We present a modification of this model for the network interaction of players. A set of grim trigger strategies is a Nash equilibrium in the repeated n-person prisoner's dilemma on a network, just as in the two-player game. However, even a slight deviation leads to the case where players get low payoffs in perpetuity without the possibility of returning to the Pareto optimal payoffs. A solution to this problem is proposed. The players' payoff functions in a game of an n-person prisoner's dilemma type on a network are described. A strategy involving a punishment on a limited interval of the game is proposed. The number of steps required for an effective punishment is found. An example of a network for this game is given. The number of steps for an effective punishment is found for the given example.
Keywords:
prisoner's dilemma, network game, effective punishment.
Received: 02.04.2021 Revised: 02.05.2021 Accepted: 02.08.2021
Citation:
A. L. Grinikh, L. A. Petrosyan, “An Effective Punishment for an n-Person Prisoner's Dilemma on a Network”, Trudy Inst. Mat. i Mekh. UrO RAN, 27, no. 3, 2021, 256–262
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/timm1854 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/timm/v27/i3/p256
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Abstract page: | 157 | Full-text PDF : | 51 | References: | 30 | First page: | 2 |
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