Abstract:
This paper considers a market where two large companies provide services to the population through “cloud” virtual operators buying companies’ services and reselling them to clients. Each large company assigns a price for selling its services to virtual operators. Also the number of its clients and its resource (a characteristic of company’s attractiveness for clients) are known. The game process is a repetition of two-step games where virtual operators choose companies and prices for their services. Each virtual operator needs to choose a company whose services he is going to sell and also to define a price for the services to be sold to clients. Each virtual operator establishes the probability to choose the company and the price for services, taking into account that the partition of company’s clients choosing a given operator is defined by the Hotelling specification. At each step, each virtual operator seeks to maximize his payoff. We find the optimal strategies of the virtual operators and also explore the following question. Does the system achieve some stationary state in this repeated two-step game or a repeating cycle of states is formed instead?
Citation:
Vladimir V. Mazalov, Julia V. Chirkova, Jie Zheng, Jaimie W. Lien, “A Game-Theoretic Model of Virtual Operators Competition in a Two-Sided Telecommunication Market”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 9:3 (2017), 36–63; Autom. Remote Control, 79:4 (2018), 737–756
\Bibitem{MazChiZhe17}
\by Vladimir~V.~Mazalov, Julia~V.~Chirkova, Jie~Zheng, Jaimie ~W.~Lien
\paper A Game-Theoretic Model of Virtual Operators Competition in a Two-Sided Telecommunication Market
\jour Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.
\yr 2017
\vol 9
\issue 3
\pages 36--63
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/mgta202}
\transl
\jour Autom. Remote Control
\yr 2018
\vol 79
\issue 4
\pages 737--756
\crossref{https://doi.org/10.1134/S0005117918040148}
\isi{https://gateway.webofknowledge.com/gateway/Gateway.cgi?GWVersion=2&SrcApp=Publons&SrcAuth=Publons_CEL&DestLinkType=FullRecord&DestApp=WOS_CPL&KeyUT=000430094200014}
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta202
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta/v9/i3/p36
This publication is cited in the following 8 articles:
Wei He, Mingzhi Li, Jie Zheng, “Switching cost, network externality and platform competition”, International Review of Economics & Finance, 84 (2023), 428
Yuan Zhi, Paul B. Hamilton, Hao Yang, Yuanyuan Sun, Guoyong Wu, Longyue Liang, Debin Xiong, “Game and preferences analysis for virtual water strategy based on a Hotelling model”, Water & Environment J, 36:2 (2022), 214
Rong Zhang, Ying Xu, Bin Liu, Lei Xie, “Pricing Strategies of Registration System and Transaction System in Live Broadcast Platform”, Discrete Dynamics in Nature and Society, 2022 (2022), 1
Vladimir Mazalov, Elena Konovalchikova, “Hotelling's Duopoly in a Two-Sided Platform Market on the Plane”, Mathematics, 8:6 (2020), 865
Networking Games, 2019, 303
Vladimir V. Mazalov, Julia V. Chirkova, Networking Games, 2019, 273
Zeng Lian, Jie Zheng, Static & Dynamic Game Theory: Foundations & Applications, Frontiers of Dynamic Games, 2019, 103
Z. Feng, T. Liu, V. V. Mazalov, J. Zheng, “Pricing of Platforms in Two-Sided Markets with Heterogeneous Agents and Limited Market Size”, Autom Remote Control, 80:7 (2019), 1347
Citation in format AMSBIB
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