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Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2017, Volume 9, Issue 3, Pages 3–35
(Mi mgta201)
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Bidding models and repeated games with incomplete information: a survey
Victoria L. Krepsab a SPb Inst. for Econ. & Math. RAS
b NRU HSE
Abstract:
With the help of a simplified model of multistage bidding with asymmetrically informed agents De Meyer and Saley [17] demonstrate an idea of endogenous origin of Brownian component in the evolution of prices on stock markets: random price fluctuations may originate from strategic randomization of “insiders”. The model is reduced to a repeated game with incomplete information. The present paper contains a survey of multiple researches inspired by this pioneering paper.
Keywords:
bidding, repeated games, asymmetric information, optimal strategies, random walk, asymptotic behavior.
Citation:
Victoria L. Kreps, “Bidding models and repeated games with incomplete information: a survey”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 9:3 (2017), 3–35
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta201 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta/v9/i3/p3
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 313 | Full-text PDF : | 177 | References: | 27 |
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