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Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city
Sergey Kokovin, Fedor Vasilev HSE University
Аннотация:
Unlike standard models of monopolistic screening (second-degree price discrimination), we consider a situation where consumers are heterogeneous not only vertically, in their willingness to pay, but also horizontally, in their tastes or “addresses” a la Hotelling's Linear City. For such a screening game, a novel model is composed. We formulate the game as an optimization program, prove the existence of equilibria, develop a method to calculate equilibria, and characterize their properties. Namely, the solution structure of the resulting menu of contracts can be either a “chain of envy” like in usual screening or a number of disconnected chains. Unlike usual screening, “almost all” consumers get positive informational rent. Importantly, the model can be extended to oligopoly screening.
Ключевые слова:
screening, price discrimination, spatial competition, linear city, principal-Agent model, non-convex optimization.
Образец цитирования:
Sergey Kokovin, Fedor Vasilev, “Screening in space: rich and poor consumers in a linear city”, Ural Math. J., 7:1 (2021), 66–80
Образцы ссылок на эту страницу:
https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/umj137 https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/umj/v7/i1/p66
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Страница аннотации: | 99 | PDF полного текста: | 74 | Список литературы: | 30 |
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