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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2015, том 8, страницы 164–175
(Mi cgtm264)
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Эта публикация цитируется в 5 научных статьях (всего в 5 статьях)
Evolutionary model of tax auditing
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena A. Gubar St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
Аннотация:
Tax audit is repeated process which occurs annually.
Therefore, we consider a dynamic model of tax auditing in this work.
It is supposed that each taxpayer can declare his income
less or equal to his true level of income after every tax period.
To simplify the model it is also
supposed that taxpayers have only two levels of income — low and
high. The tax authority assumed to use some statistical information
about taxpayers' evasions from the previous tax periods and to choose
the probability of tax auditing in the current period depends on
this information.
Every taxpayer has one of three possible risk-statuses (risk averse, risk neutral and risk preferred)
and change it depending on the external conditions.
As well as tax audit is a regular action then it can be modeled
as an evolutionary process, which take into account a revision of taxpayers' statuses.
Several modifications of evolutionary dynamics were considered.
Ключевые слова:
tax auditing, tax evasions, risk status, evolutionary games, imitation dynamics.
Образец цитирования:
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, Elena A. Gubar, “Evolutionary model of tax auditing”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8 (2015), 164–175
Образцы ссылок на эту страницу:
https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm264 https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm/v8/p164
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Страница аннотации: | 316 | PDF полного текста: | 225 | Список литературы: | 50 |
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