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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2011, том 4, страницы 266–273
(Mi cgtm193)
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Tax Auditing Models with the Application of Theory of Search
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva St. Petersburg State University,
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes,
Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
Аннотация:
One of the most important aspects of modeling of taxation — tax
control — is studied in the network of game theoretical attitude.
Realization of systematic tax audits is considered as the
interaction of two players – hiding (T – taxpayer) and seeking (A – authority) — in different statements of the search game.
In the problem statement it is assumed, that tax authority knows due
to indirect signs, that some taxpayer T evaded from taxation in the
given period (it put down lower than real income in the tax
declaration). Also it is assumed, that this taxpayer is quite a
large company, having many branches. Company can distribute the
hidden income among all or some of its branches or can hide it in
the income of one of its branches. Different game cases, which
conditions are determined by various possibilities of the evading
taxpayer and the tax authority, are considered. In the conditions of
the games considered, tax authority A solves the problem of
maximization of its income, using mixed strategies, which allow
making optimal (in sense of evasion search) tax audits. Taxpayers T
aspire to hide their income with the help of mixed strategies,
allowing to reduce a probability of revealing of their evasion.
Along with search games, in which tax authority is defined as a
search unit or, at best, as several search units, the task of tax
audits using the theory of search of immobile chain with the help of
big search system is considered. This model takes into account, that
practically tax authority is hierarchic structure and is solving
tasks on different levels (federal, regional, distirct etc.).
In this model tax authority solves the task of maximizing the
probability of revealing of evasion with the help of optimal (in
given sense) distribution of search efforts on the given period of
time. Company solves the opposite task: to distribute evasion in the
way, that minimizes probability of revealing of evasion.
Thus, different possibilities of solving the task of tax evasion
search are considered.
Ключевые слова:
tax control, taxpayers, tax authority, tax evasions, search games, theory of search.
Образец цитирования:
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, “Tax Auditing Models with the Application of Theory of Search”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 4 (2011), 266–273
Образцы ссылок на эту страницу:
https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm193 https://www.mathnet.ru/rus/cgtm/v4/p266
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