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Mathematical Modelling
A model of incentive wages as an optimal control problem
E. A. Aleksandrovaab, S. A. Anikincd a Graduate School of Management St. Petersburg University
b National Research University Higher School of Economics, Saint Petersburg, Russian Federation
c Ural Federal University Named after the First President of Russia
B. N. Yeltsin, Yekaterinburg, Russian Federation
d Institute of Mathematics and Mechanics, Ural Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Abstract:
This articles considers a «shirking» model under the theory of efficiency contracts, which determines the profile of a worker's individual wages depending on his experience. The profile is a stimulating condition to increase productivity and the period of employment. Certain additional assumtions reduce the model to a nonclassical variational problem or a linear optimal control problem. We prove nonemptiness criteria and the existence of solutions, find necessary and sufficient conditions for optimality, give an algorithm to solve the problem, and present the results of simulations.
Keywords:
«shirking» model; an efficiency contract model; an efficiency wage model; incentive wages; nonclassical variational problem; linear optimal control problem.
Received: 22.06.2014
Citation:
E. A. Aleksandrova, S. A. Anikin, “A model of incentive wages as an optimal control problem”, Vestnik YuUrGU. Ser. Mat. Model. Progr., 7:4 (2014), 22–35
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/vyuru235 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/vyuru/v7/i4/p22
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