Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Seriya 10. Prikladnaya Matematika. Informatika. Protsessy Upravleniya
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Vestnik Sankt-Peterburgskogo Universiteta. Seriya 10. Prikladnaya Matematika. Informatika. Protsessy Upravleniya, 2022, Volume 18, Issue 4, Pages 501–515
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu10.2022.405
(Mi vspui551)
 

Applied mathematics

Equilibrium in the problem of choosing the meeting time for $N$ persons

V. V. Mazalovab, V. V. Yashinb

a St Petersburg State University, 7–9, Universitetskaya nab., St Petersburg, 199034, Russian Federation
b Institute of Applied Mathematical Research, Karelian Research Centre of Russian Academy of Sciences, 11, ul. Pushkinskaya, Petrozavodsk, 185910, Russian Federation
References:
Abstract: A game-theoretic model of competitive decision on a meet time is considered. There are $n$ players who are negotiating the meeting time. The objective is to find a meet time that satisfies all participants. The players' utilities are represented by linear unimodal functions $u_i(x), x\in[0, 1], i=1,2,...,n$. The maximum values of the utility functions are located at the points $i/(n-1), ~i=0,...,n-1$. Players take turns $1 \rightarrow 2\rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \ldots\rightarrow (n-1) \rightarrow n\rightarrow 1\rightarrow\dots ~. $ Players can indefinitely insist on a profitable solution for themselves. To prevent this from happening, a discounting factor $\delta<1$ is introduced to limit the duration of negotiations. We will assume that after each negotiation session, the utility functions of all players will decrease proportionally to $\delta$. Thus, if the players have not come to a decision before time $t$, then at time $t$ their utilities are represented by the functions $\delta^{t-1}u_i(x), ~i = 1, 2,..., n.$ We will look for a solution in the class of stationary strategies, when it is assumed that the decisions of the players will not change during the negotiation time, i. e. the player $i$ will make the same offer at step $i$ and at subsequent steps $n+i, 2n+i, \ldots$ . This will allow us to limit ourselves to considering the chain of sentences $1 \rightarrow 2 \rightarrow 3 \rightarrow \ldots \rightarrow(n-1) \rightarrow n\rightarrow 1.$ We will use the method of backward induction. To do this, assume that player $n$ is looking for his best responce, knowing player $1$'s proposal, then player $(n-1)$ is looking for his best responce, knowing player $n$'s solution, etc. In the end, we find the best responce of the player $1$, and it should coincide with his offer at the beginning of the procedure. Thus, the reasoning in the method of backward induction has the form $1 \leftarrow 2\leftarrow 3\leftarrow \ldots\leftarrow(n-1)\leftarrow n\leftarrow 1.$ The subgame perfect equilibrium in the class of stationary strategies is found in analytical form. It is shown that when $\delta$ changes from $1$ to $0$, the optimal offer of player $1$ changes from $\frac{1}{2}$ to $1$. That is, when the value of $\delta$ is close to $1$, the players have a lot of time to negotiate, so the offer of player $1$ should be fair to everyone. If the discounting factor is close to $0$, the utilities of the players decreases rapidly and they must quickly make a decision that is beneficial to player $1$.
Keywords: optimal timing, linear utility functions, sequential bargaining, Rubinstein bargaining model, subgame perfect equilibrium, stationary strategies, backward induction.
Funding agency
This work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation (grant N 22-11-00051, https://rscf.ru/project/22-11-00051/).
Received: August 8, 2022
Accepted: September 1, 2022
Bibliographic databases:
Document Type: Article
UDC: 519.8
MSC: 91B26, 91A55
Language: Russian
Citation: V. V. Mazalov, V. V. Yashin, “Equilibrium in the problem of choosing the meeting time for $N$ persons”, Vestnik S.-Petersburg Univ. Ser. 10. Prikl. Mat. Inform. Prots. Upr., 18:4 (2022), 501–515
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{MazYas22}
\by V.~V.~Mazalov, V.~V.~Yashin
\paper Equilibrium in the problem of choosing the meeting time for $N$ persons
\jour Vestnik S.-Petersburg Univ. Ser. 10. Prikl. Mat. Inform. Prots. Upr.
\yr 2022
\vol 18
\issue 4
\pages 501--515
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/vspui551}
\crossref{https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu10.2022.405}
\mathscinet{http://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=4508471}
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