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Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami, 2013, Issue 46, Pages 216–265
(Mi ubs738)
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This article is cited in 12 scientific papers (total in 12 papers)
Control in Social and Economic Systems
Efficient solution of allotment problem with Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility
N. A. Korgin, V. O. Korepanov Institute of Control Sciences of RAS
Abstract:
We consider a problem of allocation of limited amount of divisible good among a finite number of agents under transferable utility. We design a mechanism which implements a Pareto efficient allocation as a Nash equilibrium of the induced game. This mechanism is an adaptation of the Groves–Ledyard “quadratic government” that was initially offered for the problem of public good.
Keywords:
mechanism design, Nash implementation, allotment problem.
Citation:
N. A. Korgin, V. O. Korepanov, “Efficient solution of allotment problem with Groves–Ledyard mechanism under transferable utility”, UBS, 46 (2013), 216–265; Autom. Remote Control, 77:5 (2016), 914–942
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs738 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs/v46/p216
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 285 | Full-text PDF : | 125 | References: | 48 | First page: | 2 |
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