Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami
RUS  ENG    JOURNALS   PEOPLE   ORGANISATIONS   CONFERENCES   SEMINARS   VIDEO LIBRARY   PACKAGE AMSBIB  
General information
Latest issue
Archive
Impact factor

Search papers
Search references

RSS
Latest issue
Current issues
Archive issues
What is RSS



UBS:
Year:
Volume:
Issue:
Page:
Find






Personal entry:
Login:
Password:
Save password
Enter
Forgotten password?
Register


Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami, 2010, Issue 31.1, , Pages 210–238 (Mi ubs477)  

This article is cited in 2 scientific papers (total in 2 papers)

Control in Social and Economic Systems

Game-theoretic analysis of one-stage and two-stage homogeneous good auctions

A. A. Vasin, A. G. Gusev, A. A. Sharikova

Moscow State University
Full-text PDF (567 kB) Citations (2)
References:
Abstract: Forward market is a known instrument for reduction of market power of large producers. This paper examines a two-stage oligopoly environment with constant marginal cost. The outcome at both the forward and the spot market is a Cournot outcome dependent on correspondent demand and supply at the market. Producers aim to maximize their profits via choosing subgame perfect equilibrium of the two-stage game as their strategies. In the first part of the current research we extend the model by Bushnell (2005) considering a capacity constraint. Our results show that the optimal way of market organization in such a model strongly depends on the difference between the maximal production volume and the demand volume at price equal to the marginal cost. In the second part of the paper we consider proportional rationing instead of surplus maximizing rationing at the forward market. We show that for such a model there exists only an SPE in correlated mixed strategies. Producers' behavior should depend on some random variable that determines one of two possibilities for the spot market: either the “bear market”, or the “bull market”. We compare this SPE with Nash equilibria of one-stage markets.
Keywords: forward market, Cournot oligopoly, market power, subgame perfect equilibrium.
Document Type: Article
UDC: 519.837.4 + 517.977.8
BBC: 22.18
Language: Russian
Citation: A. A. Vasin, A. G. Gusev, A. A. Sharikova, “Game-theoretic analysis of one-stage and two-stage homogeneous good auctions”, UBS, 31.1 (2010), 210–238
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{VasGusSha10}
\by A.~A.~Vasin, A.~G.~Gusev, A.~A.~Sharikova
\paper Game-theoretic analysis of one-stage and two-stage homogeneous good auctions
\jour UBS
\yr 2010
\vol 31.1
\pages 210--238
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/ubs477}
Linking options:
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs477
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs/v31/i1/p210
    Cycle of papers
    This publication is cited in the following 2 articles:
    Citing articles in Google Scholar: Russian citations, English citations
    Related articles in Google Scholar: Russian articles, English articles
    Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami
     
      Contact us:
     Terms of Use  Registration to the website  Logotypes © Steklov Mathematical Institute RAS, 2024