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Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami, 2010, Issue 31, Pages 265–275 (Mi ubs461)  

This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)

Control in Social and Economic Systems

Оn a problem of information control in social networks

D. Fedyanina, A. Chkhartishvilib

a Repetit-Center
b Institute of Control Sciences of RAS
Full-text PDF (254 kB) Citations (1)
References:
Abstract: The game-theoretical model used in this paper is the composition of the Markov model of social networks and the new model describing behavior of agents under group incentives provided by the principal. The article describes the Nash equilibrium and the conditions on the types of agents in a social network. Then the optimal information control mechanism of agents’ types is built to maximize the payoff of the principal.
Keywords: social network, Nash equilibrium, information control.
Document Type: Article
UDC: 519.711.2
BBC: 60.54
Language: Russian
Citation: D. Fedyanin, A. Chkhartishvili, “Оn a problem of information control in social networks”, UBS, 31 (2010), 265–275
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{FedChk10}
\by D.~Fedyanin, A.~Chkhartishvili
\paper Оn a problem of information control in social networks
\jour UBS
\yr 2010
\vol 31
\pages 265--275
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/ubs461}
Linking options:
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs461
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs/v31/p265
  • This publication is cited in the following 1 articles:
    Citing articles in Google Scholar: Russian citations, English citations
    Related articles in Google Scholar: Russian articles, English articles
    Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami
    Statistics & downloads:
    Abstract page:264
    Full-text PDF :119
    References:35
    First page:2
     
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