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Upravlenie Bol'shimi Sistemami, 2009, Issue 26.1, , Pages 177–192
(Mi ubs344)
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Control in Social and Economic Systems
A tax game in a cournot duopoly
Alexander Galegov, Andrey Garnaev Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, St. Petersburg State University, Saint Petersburg
Abstract:
Stackelberg models for hierarchical oligopolistic markets with a homogenous product were studied by researchers extensively. The goal of this paper is to extend the classical solution in closed form of the Stackelberg model for a general hierarchical structures composed by firms arranged into groups of different hierarchical levels.
Keywords:
hierarchical structures, multi-level Stackelberg equilibrium, Nash-Cournot equilibrium.
Citation:
Alexander Galegov, Andrey Garnaev, “A tax game in a cournot duopoly”, UBS, 26.1 (2009), 177–192
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs344 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/ubs/v26/i1/p177
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 471 | Full-text PDF : | 126 | References: | 54 |
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