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Taurida Journal of Computer Science Theory and Mathematics, 2019, Issue 3, Pages 66–81
(Mi tvim73)
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Hybrid equilibrium in $N$-person games
K. N. Kudryavtsevab, V. I. Zhukovskiic, L. V. Zhukovskayad a South Ural State University, 76, Lenin prospekt, Chelyabinsk, 45480, Russia
b Chelyabinsk State University, 129, Bratiev Kashirinykh st., Chelyabinsk, 454001, Russia
c Lomonosov Moscow State University, Faculty of Computational Mathematics and Cybernetics, 1, Leninskiye Gory, Moscow, Russia, 119991
d Central Economics and Mathematics Institute of Russian Academy of Science, 32, Nakhimovsky prospect, Moscow, 117418, Russia
Abstract:
How can we combine altruism of Berge equilibrium with selfishness of Nash equilibrium? The positive answer to this question will be given below. In short, they can be combined but in the class of mixed strategies. For a noncooperative $N$-player normal form game, we introduce the concept of hybrid equilibrium (HE) by synthesizing the concepts of Nash and Berge equilibria and Pareto maximum. Some properties of this equilibrium
are explored and its existence in mixed strategies is established under standard assumptions of mathematical game theory (convex and compact strategy sets and continuous payoff functions).
Keywords:
Berge equilibrium, Nash equilibrium, Pareto optimum, Germeier convolution, noncooperative game.
Citation:
K. N. Kudryavtsev, V. I. Zhukovskii, L. V. Zhukovskaya, “Hybrid equilibrium in $N$-person games”, Taurida Journal of Computer Science Theory and Mathematics, 2019, no. 3, 66–81
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/tvim73 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/tvim/y2019/i3/p66
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Abstract page: | 46 | Full-text PDF : | 25 |
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