Hidden impact without malicious code

The paper reflects a number of problems related to threats to distributed information systems due to the presence of BackDoor. The usage of BackDoor to attack distributed computer systems has great advantages over the traditional usage of malicious code. In fact, the usage of BackDoor is difficult to identify as a special attack, i. e., distinguish from error in computing processes. However, building attacks with BackDoor is much more difficult than building attacks with malicious code. The example of BackDoor is built using the initial data of information technology. This approach to the construction of BackDoor was not found in any of the descriptions of BackDoor. The paper shows that the existing technologies for finding vulnerabilities in the hardware and software of the system do not solve the problems of searching for BackDoor. Mathematical models and methods for solving BackDoor search problems, except in particular cases, have not yet been developed. It is important that BackDoor is not associated with the introduction of malicious code into the computer system and with the usage of malicious code to cause damage. Therefore, as a rule, the mechanism of causing damage through BackDoor differs from the action of malicious code.