|
Oligopolistic interacting markets
V. I. Zorkaltsev, M. A. Kiseleva Melentiev Energy Systems Institute of Siberian Branch of the Russian Academy of Sciences, 130 Lermontov str., Irkutsk, 664033, Russia
Abstract:
The model of several interacting Cournot markets is considered. The markets are named
interacting because the same number of producers act on each of them. Every producer chooses his own supply volumes on every market using the price situations, his own costs and production and delivery limitations. It is proved that in the case of the linear demand functions the problem of finding the Nash equilibria in the interacting Cournot markets model represents a potential game, i.e. it is equivalent to a mathematical programming problem. Nonlinear demand functions linearization procedures and preferences of initial problem reduction to the potential game are discussed.
Key words:
Cournot model, Nash equilibria, potential game.
Received: 28.08.2014 Revised: 05.02.2015
Citation:
V. I. Zorkaltsev, M. A. Kiseleva, “Oligopolistic interacting markets”, Sib. Zh. Vychisl. Mat., 18:4 (2015), 361–368; Num. Anal. Appl., 8:4 (2015), 293–298
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/sjvm588 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/sjvm/v18/i4/p361
|
Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 177 | Full-text PDF : | 74 | References: | 35 | First page: | 5 |
|