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Problemy Upravleniya, 2012, Issue 5, Pages 26–32
(Mi pu737)
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This article is cited in 7 scientific papers (total in 7 papers)
Control in the socio-economic systems
Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetric anonymous voting procedures with delegation
V. N. Bondarika, N. A. Korginb a Moscow Institute of Physics and Technology, Dolgoprudnyi
b Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
Abstract:
The characterization of symmetric anonymous generalized median voting schemes which are suitable for resource allocation by voting with delegation – when any agent is allowed do announce not only whole allocation, which is the best to his opinion, but just several components of this vertex, is provided including the description of class of feasible delegation rules.
Citation:
V. N. Bondarik, N. A. Korgin, “Resource allocation mechanisms based on strategy-proof symmetric anonymous voting procedures with delegation”, Probl. Upr., 2012, no. 5, 26–32; Automation and Remote Control, 74:9 (2013), 1557–1566
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/pu737 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/pu/v5/p26
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 209 | Full-text PDF : | 52 | References: | 44 | First page: | 7 |
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