Some social and ethical norms of behavior: mathematical modeling using game-theoretic approaches

This paper overviews game-theoretic approaches to model the impact of prevailing behavioral norms (selfishness and altruism, morality on the example of Kant's imperative or the Golden Rule of ethics) on the development of some community. In addition, we study the effectiveness of the community depending on the prevailing worldview of its representatives. The equilibrium of the maximum cooperative income is investigated for communities whose representatives observe, to some extent, public interests rather than personal ones. The effectiveness of communities whose representatives follow Kant's imperative or the Golden Rule of ethics is considered using a game-theoretic model of social choice between two norms of behavior: one generally accepted but obsolete, and another new, not yet widespread, but advanced and progressive. The results can be used to assess the effectiveness of ongoing pedagogical work and state planning in the areas of upbringing and education.