Tax incentives for prosocial Voting in a Stochastic Environment

Three income redistribution algorithms supporting the agents with prosocial voting are considered within the Voting in Stochastic Environment (ViSE) model of social dynamics. The first algorithm is income tax; the second one ensures that the income of each agent with the prosocial strategy is not smaller than the average income; the third one ensures that the average income of prosocial agents is not smaller than that of the entire society. The social utility of prosocial voting is analyzed. The three algorithms are compared with each other. The effectiveness of income tax depends on the environment. The second and third algorithms do not suffer from this disadvantage. However, under certain conditions, the second algorithm provides too many bonuses to prosocial agents. With any of these income redistribution algorithms, the egoists get more profit than in a society without any prosocial agents. Thus, whenever such tax schemes motivate some participants to choose the prosocial voting strategy, this will increase the expected income of all agents.