Optimality of the incentive compatible mechanisms in network organizational structures

The paper considers the problems of optimal control mechanisms design for an interconnected agents system provided incomplete awareness conditions of the governing body (center) about the parameters of agents. A directed graph that does not contain contours presents the connections of the agents in this system. Agents have their own goals and transmit information about their parameters to the center. They can intentionally distort data if distortion is beneficial to them. The center controls the behavior of agents. The behavior of agents is to inform the center about their parameters and the choice of their states. The ability of subsequent agents to select their states depends on the state selected by a preceding agent. The given directed graph determines the precedence structure of agents. The center's management consists of choosing a mechanism that includes planning procedures in the form of functions that depend on the information received from the agents and the incentive system. The incentive system consists of the functions of fines for deviating the state of the agent from the plan and the functions of encouraging agents for choosing the state. Optimal mechanisms are designed in accordance with which agents are not interested in manipulating the information communicated to the center and the implementation of plans. Conditions of incentive compatibility are determined that ensure this behavior of agents without decreasing the optimal value of the objective function of the center. The results of the study can be useful in managing the implementation of complex projects or assembly plants.