Information theoretically secure key sharing protocol executing with constant noiseless public channels

We propose a new key sharing protocol executing with constant public noiseless (at least for eavesdroppers) channels. In contrast to well-known protocols (like Diffie-Hellman etc.) it does not use cryptographic assumptions (like integer factoring, discrete logarithm etc.). This protocol does not imply any advantages for legitimate users against eavesdroppers except for authentication. It is based on EVSKey Scheme, proposed recently by G. Qin and Z. Ding. But because we prove that such scheme is insecure, it needs significant modification. We introduce an artificial noise and privacy amplification procedure for this purpose. Simulation results are presented concerning key bit error probabilities for both legitimate and illegal users. The error decoding probabilities are calculated for LDPC codes application. The amount of Shannon information leaking to eavesdroppers is estimated. The channel traffic needed for execution of the proposed protocol is given too.