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Improving OBDD attacks against stream ciphers
M. Hamann, M. Krause, A. Moch Universität Mannheim, Germany
Abstract:
OBDD-attacks against stream ciphers compute the secret initial state by generating a sequence of $\mathcal{O}(n)$ ordered binary decision diagrams (OBDDs) of maximal width $\mathcal{O}(2^{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\alpha}n})$, where $n$ denotes the inner state length and $\alpha\in (0,1)$ is the compression rate of the cipher. We propose and experimentally verify the following strategy of avoiding the huge storage demand of $\mathcal{O}(2^{\frac{1-\alpha}{1+\alpha}n})$. (1) Generate in parallel two OBDDs $P$ and $Q$ such that $P \wedge Q$ has only a few satisfying assignments. (2) Compute the set $(P \wedge Q)^{-1}(1)$, containing the secret inner state, by a new breadth-first-search based algorithm. We show that this approach improves standard OBDD-attacks drastically.
Key words:
symmetric cryptography, stream ciphers, OBDD attacks.
Received 05.XI.2019
Citation:
M. Hamann, M. Krause, A. Moch, “Improving OBDD attacks against stream ciphers”, Mat. Vopr. Kriptogr., 11:2 (2020), 137–151
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mvk327https://doi.org/10.4213/mvk327 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mvk/v11/i2/p137
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