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An Asymptotic Value of a Cooperative Game with Infinitely Many Disparate Participants
G. N. Dyubin St. Petersburg Institute for Economics and Mathematics, Russian Academy of Sciences
Abstract:
In the article, we define the asymptotic value for an infinite cooperative game $v$ associated with an admissible sequence of partitions of the unit segment and a probability measure $\mu$ defined on its Borel $\sigma$-algebra. The function $v$ is assumed to be absolutely continuous relative to $\mu$; moreover (in contrast to standard settings), this measure may have an atomic component. The use of a new variational norm, the polynomial variation of a nonadditive set function, plays a crucial role in defining the class of games with the asymptotic value. The main result of the article consists in establishing simple natural conditions for existence and countable additivity of the values for games of bounded polynomial variation.
Key words:
polynomial variation of a nonadditive set function, admissible sequence of partitions, asymptotic value of a cooperative game.
Received: 17.06.1996
Citation:
G. N. Dyubin, “An Asymptotic Value of a Cooperative Game with Infinitely Many Disparate Participants”, Mat. Tr., 2:2 (1999), 12–20; Siberian Adv. Math., 10:2 (2000), 1–8
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mt152 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mt/v2/i2/p12
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Abstract page: | 198 | Full-text PDF : | 97 | First page: | 1 |
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