Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya
RUS  ENG    JOURNALS   PEOPLE   ORGANISATIONS   CONFERENCES   SEMINARS   VIDEO LIBRARY   PACKAGE AMSBIB  
General information
Latest issue
Archive
Impact factor

Search papers
Search references

RSS
Latest issue
Current issues
Archive issues
What is RSS



Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.:
Year:
Volume:
Issue:
Page:
Find






Personal entry:
Login:
Password:
Save password
Enter
Forgotten password?
Register


Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2021, Volume 13, Issue 2, Pages 62–79 (Mi mgta281)  

Machine Load Balancing Game with linear externalities

Julia V. Chirkova

IAMR KarRC RAS
References:
Abstract: The Machine Load Balancing Game with linear externalities is considered. A set of jobs is to be assigned to a set of machines with different latencies depending on their own loads and also loads on other machines. Jobs choose machines to minimize their own latencies. The social cost of a schedule is the maximum delay among all machines, i.e. makespan. For the case of two machines in this model an Nash equilibrium existence is proven and of the expression for the Price of Anarchy is obtained.
Keywords: machine load balancing game, linear externalities, Nash equilibrium, price of anarchy.
Received: 24.12.2020
Revised: 11.02.2021
Accepted: 01.03.2021
Document Type: Article
UDC: 519.711.7
BBC: 22.1
Language: Russian
Citation: Julia V. Chirkova, “Machine Load Balancing Game with linear externalities”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 13:2 (2021), 62–79
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{Chi21}
\by Julia~V.~Chirkova
\paper Machine Load Balancing Game with linear externalities
\jour Mat. Teor. Igr Pril.
\yr 2021
\vol 13
\issue 2
\pages 62--79
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/mgta281}
Linking options:
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta281
  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta/v13/i2/p62
  • Citing articles in Google Scholar: Russian citations, English citations
    Related articles in Google Scholar: Russian articles, English articles
    Математическая теория игр и её приложения
    Statistics & downloads:
    Abstract page:102
    Full-text PDF :41
    References:23
     
      Contact us:
     Terms of Use  Registration to the website  Logotypes © Steklov Mathematical Institute RAS, 2024