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Matematicheskaya Teoriya Igr i Ee Prilozheniya, 2019, Volume 11, Issue 1, Pages 73–95
(Mi mgta231)
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This article is cited in 3 scientific papers (total in 3 papers)
Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games
Fengyan Sunab, Elena M. Parilinaabc, Hongwei Gaob a Saint Petersburg State University
b School of Mathematics and Statistics, Qingdao University
c Institute of Applied
Mathematics of Shandong
Abstract:
Cooperative games with coalition structures are considered and a principle of coalition structure individual stability with respect to some cooperative solution concepts is determined. In comparison with the paper (Sedakov et al., 2013), we consider the opportunity of the players to block the deviation of a player in case their payoffs decrease with the deviation. We prove the existence of an individually stable coalition structure with respect to the Shapley and equal surplus division values for the case of three-person games according to the new definition of a stable coalition structure.
Keywords:
coalition structure, stability, the Shapley value, the ES-value.
Received: 24.12.2018 Revised: 18.03.2019 Accepted: 20.03.2019
Citation:
Fengyan Sun, Elena M. Parilina, Hongwei Gao, “Individual stability of coalition structures in three-person games”, Mat. Teor. Igr Pril., 11:1 (2019), 73–95; Autom. Remote Control, 82:6 (2021), 1083–1094
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta231 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/mgta/v11/i1/p73
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