Mathematical direct identifier model mechanisms for the problem of interaction of the innovator and investors in the system of innovative investment

While for traditional industries the use of statistical data and risk control is a common approach to the problem of uncertainty, for innovation projects such method is not applicable due to the natural lack of a reliable statistical base. In practice we see that the empirical mechanisms used for evaluation of innovation projects are rarely used during investing in traditional industries and vice versa. In this regard, there arises the problem of developing an effective mechanism for managing the investment system under uncertainty in general and the system of innovative investment in particular. The paper proposes a direct revealing mechanism for the innovator-investor system in the form of a Bayesian non-cooperative, repetitive game with recalculated payouts. The equilibrium parameters are obtained for any period of this game. It is shown that the strategic equilibrium for the whole game can be achieved on the basis of the adjustment of a priori estimates of the investor and innovator according to the well-known Regret Matching rule.