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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence
V. L. Kreps
Abstract:
Dropping the assumption of the stochastic independence of players' randomised choices in non-cooperative games, we introduce the notion of a type of dependence. It is proved that the stochastic independence is the unique type of dependence for which any finite non-cooperative game has a Nash equilibrium in mixed strategies.
Received: 18.11.2008
Citation:
V. L. Kreps, “On game-theoretic characterisation of stochastic independence”, Diskr. Mat., 22:1 (2010), 115–125; Discrete Math. Appl., 20:3 (2010), 277–289
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/dm1088https://doi.org/10.4213/dm1088 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/dm/v22/i1/p115
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Abstract page: | 422 | Full-text PDF : | 230 | References: | 57 | First page: | 18 |
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