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Diskretnyi Analiz i Issledovanie Operatsii, 2011, Volume 18, Issue 4, Pages 77–93
(Mi da661)
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This article is cited in 2 scientific papers (total in 2 papers)
On a generalization of $N$-nucleolus in cooperative games
N. V. Smirnovaab, S. I. Tarashinaba a Saint-Petersburg State University, Saint-Petersburg, Russia
b International Banking Institute, Saint-Petersburg, Russia
Abstract:
We describe a new solution concept for a cooperative TU-game, called the $[0,1]$-nucleolus. It is based on the ideas of the nucleolus and the simplified modified nucleolus. The $[0,1]$-nucleolus takes into account both the constructive and the blocking powers of a coalition with all possible ratios between them. We show that this solution satisfies the following properties: nonemptiness (NE), covariance property (COV), anonimity (AN), Pareto optimality (PO), reasonableness (RE), and dummy player (DUM). Moreover, the $[0,1]$-nucleolus satisfies the individual rationality property (IR) for the class of 0-monotonic games and the single valued property (SIVA) for the class of constant-sum games. We also investigate connection between the $[0,1]$-nucleolus and some well-known solutions of cooperative TU-games such as the Shapley value, the prenucleolus, the simplified modified nucleolus and the modiclus. Tabl. 1, ill. 1, bibliogr. 8.
Keywords:
TU-game, solution concept, the prenucleolus, the simplified modified nucleolus, the modified nucleolus (the modiclus).
Received: 26.12.2010
Citation:
N. V. Smirnova, S. I. Tarashina, “On a generalization of $N$-nucleolus in cooperative games”, Diskretn. Anal. Issled. Oper., 18:4 (2011), 77–93
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/da661 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/da/v18/i4/p77
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Abstract page: | 423 | Full-text PDF : | 124 | References: | 35 | First page: | 6 |
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