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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2010, Volume 3, Pages 267–279
(Mi cgtm90)
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This article is cited in 3 scientific papers (total in 3 papers)
Non-Constant Discounting in Differential Games with Random Duration
Jesús Marín-Solanoa, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyasb a Universitat de Barcelona, Departament de Matemàtica Econòmica, Financera i Actuarial, Av. Diagonal 690, Barcelona, 08034 Spain
b St. Petersburg State University,
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes,
Universitetskii pr., 35, Petergof, St. Petersburg, 198904 Russia
Abstract:
Previous results on non-constant discounting in continuous time are extended to the field of deterministic differential games with a stochastic terminal time. Different cooperative and non-cooperative solution concepts for differential games with random duration are analyzed. The results are illustrated by solving the cake-eating problem describing the classical model of management of a nonrenewable resource for a logarithmic utility function. Time-consistency in cooperative differential games with non-constant discounting is briefly discussed.
Keywords:
non-constant discounting, naive and sophisticated agents, random duration, differential games, non-renewable resources.
Citation:
Jesús Marín-Solano, Ekaterina V. Shevkoplyas, “Non-Constant Discounting in Differential Games with Random Duration”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 3 (2010), 267–279
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm90 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v3/p267
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