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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2022, Volume 15, Pages 236–249
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.18
(Mi cgtm427)
 

Comparing the manipulability of approval voting and borda

Daria Teplovaa, Egor Ianovskib

a ITMO University, 49, Kronversky pr., St. Petersburg, 197101, Russia
b HSE University, 16, ul. Soyuza Pechatnikov, St. Petersburg, 190121, Russia
References:
Abstract: The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem established that no non-trivial voting rule is strategy-proof, but that does not mean that all voting rules are equally susceptible to strategic manipulation. Over the past fifty years numerous approaches have been proposed to compare the manipulability of voting rules in terms of the probability of manipulation, the domains on which manipulation is possible, the complexity of finding such a manipulation, and others. In the closely related field of matching, Pathak and Sönmez (2013) pioneered a notion of manipulability based on case-by-case comparison of manipulable profiles. The advantage of this approach is that it is independent of the underlying statistical culture or the computational power of the agents, and it has proven fruitful in the matching literature. In this paper, we extend the notion of Pathak and Sönmez to voting, studying the families of $k$-approval and truncated Borda scoring rules. We find that, with one exception, the notion does not allow for a meaningful ordering of the manipulability of these rules.
Keywords: social choice, strategic voting, Borda, scoring rules.
Funding agency Grant number
HSE Basic Research Program
Support from the Basic Research Program of HSE University is gratefully acknowledged.
Bibliographic databases:
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: Daria Teplova, Egor Ianovski, “Comparing the manipulability of approval voting and borda”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 15 (2022), 236–249
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{TepIan22}
\by Daria~Teplova, Egor~Ianovski
\paper Comparing the manipulability of approval voting and borda
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2022
\vol 15
\pages 236--249
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm427}
\crossref{https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2022.18}
\mathscinet{http://mathscinet.ams.org/mathscinet-getitem?mr=4589469}
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