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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2021, Volume 14, Pages 8–19
DOI: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.01 (Mi cgtm383) 		 
This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)

Static and dynamic game theoretic models of opinion control in marketing networks

Movlatkhan T. Agievaa, Alexey V. Korolevb, Guennady A. Ougolnitskyc

a Ingush State University, Magistralnaya St. 39, Nazran, 386132, Russia
b National Research University, Higher School of Economics at St. Petersburg, Kantemirovskaya St. 3A, St. Petersburg, 190008, Russia
c Southern Federal University, J.I. Vorovich Institute of Mathematics, Mechanics and Computer Sciences, Milchakov St. 8a, Rostov-on-Don, 344090, Russia
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DOI: https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.01
Abstract: In this paper we consider game theoretic models of control on networks with application to marketing. We suppose that all strong subgroups are determined in the stage of analysis of the influence digraph, and the control impact is exerted only to the members of those subgroups because they determine all stable final opinions. An agent's opinion is interpreted as his expenses for buying goods (services) of a firm. The following problem of opinion control is being studied. A dynamic (difference) game in normal form where the players solve the problem of maximization of the sum of opinions of the members of a target audience by means of the closed-loop strategies of impact to the current opinions of the members of strong subgroups. We received the analytical solutions and conducted their comparative analysis.
Keywords: games in normal form, models of impact and control on networks, marketing.
Funding agency Grant number
Russian Science Foundation 17-19-01038
The work was supported by the Russian Science Foundation, project 17-19-01038.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: Movlatkhan T. Agieva, Alexey V. Korolev, Guennady A. Ougolnitsky, “Static and dynamic game theoretic models of opinion control in marketing networks”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 14 (2021), 8–19
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{AgiKorOug21}
\by Movlatkhan~T.~Agieva, Alexey~V.~Korolev, Guennady~A.~Ougolnitsky
\paper Static and dynamic game theoretic models of opinion control in marketing networks
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2021
\vol 14
\pages 8--19
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm383}
\crossref{https://doi.org/10.21638/11701/spbu31.2021.01}
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    • This publication is cited in the following 1 articles:
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