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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2007, Volume 1, Pages 478–496
(Mi cgtm28)
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Contractual Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange Economy
Valeri Vasil'ev Sobolev Institute of Mathematics,
Russian Academy of Sciences, Siberian Branch,
Prosp. Acad. Koptyuga 4, Novosibirsk, 630090, Russia
Abstract:
In the paper, a game-theoretical analysis of some stable outcomes in pure exchange economies is given. We deal, mostly, with an equilibrium characterization of unblocked allocations generated by recontracting process close to the one introduced by V. L. Makarov [Makarov, 1980]. Rather mild assumptions, providing coincidence of the corresponding contractual core and the set of Walrasian equilibrium allocations, are established, and two examples, demonstrating relevance of the main assumptions, are proposed.
Keywords:
M-contract, weak quasi-stable contractual system, weak totally contractual core, competitive equilibrium.
Citation:
Valeri Vasil'ev, “Contractual Stability and Competitive Equilibrium in a Pure Exchange Economy”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 1 (2007), 478–496
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm28 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v1/p478
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