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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2015, Volume 8, Pages 223–230
(Mi cgtm268)
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Cooperation in transportation game
Anna V. Melnik St. Petersburg State University,
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes,
Universitetskii pr. 35, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
Abstract:
We consider a game-theoretic model of competition and cooperation of transport companies on a graph. First, a non-cooperative n-person game which is related to the queueing system M/M/n is considered. There are n competing transport companies which serve the stream of passengers with exponential distribution of time with parameters μ(i), i=1,2,…,n respectively on the graph of routes. The stream of passengers from a stop k to another stop t forms the Poisson process with intensity λkt. The transport companies announce the prices for the service on each route and the passengers choose the service with minimal costs. The incoming stream λkt is divided into n Poisson flows with intensities λ(i)kt, i=1,2,…,n. The problem of pricing for each player in the competition and cooperation is solved.
Keywords:
Duopoly, equilibrium prices, queueing system.
Citation:
Anna V. Melnik, “Cooperation in transportation game”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 8 (2015), 223–230
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm268 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v8/p223
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 175 | Full-text PDF : | 107 | References: | 43 |
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