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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2014, Volume 7, Pages 51–60
(Mi cgtm219)
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On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria
Michael Finusa, Pierre von Moucheb, Bianca Rundshagenc a University of Bath, Department of Economics, Bath BA2 7AY, United Kingdom
b Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
c Universität Hagen, Department of Economics, Universitätsstrasse 11, 58097 Hagen, Germany
Abstract:
For the so-called ‘new approach’ of coalition formation it is important that coalitional equilibria are unique. Uniqueness comes down to existence and to semi-uniqueness, i.e. there exists at most one equilibrium. Although conditions for existence are not problematic, conditions for semi-uniqueness are. We provide semi-uniqueness conditions by deriving a new equilibrium semi-uniqueness result for games in strategic form with higher dimensional action sets. The result applies in particular to Cournot-like games.
Keywords:
Coalition formation, Cournot oligopoly, equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, game in strategic form, public good.
Citation:
Michael Finus, Pierre von Mouche, Bianca Rundshagen, “On uniqueness of coalitional equilibria”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 7 (2014), 51–60
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm219 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v7/p51
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