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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2011, Volume 4, Pages 19–32 (Mi cgtm176)  
Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals

G. Attanasia, A. García-Gallegobc, N. Georgantzísbcd, A. Montesanoe

a LERNA, Toulouse School of Economics
b GLOBE, U. of Granada
c LEE, U. Jaume I of Castellón
d BELIS, U. of Istambul
e Bocconi University, Milan (Italy)
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Abstract: We propose a bargaining process with alternating proposals as a way of solving non-cooperative games, giving rise to Pareto efficient agreements which will, in general, differ from the Nash equilibrium of the original games.
Keywords: Bargaining; Confirmed Proposals; Confirmed Agreement.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: G. Attanasi, A. García-Gallego, N. Georgantzís, A. Montesano, “Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 4 (2011), 19–32
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{AttGarGeo11}
\by G.~Attanasi, A.~Garc{\'\i}a-Gallego, N.~Georgantz{\'\i}s, A.~Montesano
\paper Non-Cooperative Games with Chained Confirmed Proposals
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2011
\vol 4
\pages 19--32
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm176}
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