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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2012, Volume 5, Pages 230–242
(Mi cgtm161)
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This article is cited in 4 scientific papers (total in 4 papers)
Generalized Proportional Solutions to Games with Restricted Cooperation
Natalia I. Naumova St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Mathematics and Mechanics, Universitetsky pr. 28, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
Abstract:
In TU-cooperative game with restricted cooperation
the values of characteristic function $v(S)$ are defined only for $S\in \mathcal{A}$, where $\mathcal{A}$
is a collection of some nonempty coalitions of players. If $\mathcal{A}$ is a set of all singletones, then a claim
problem arises, thus we have a claim problem with coalition demands.
We examine several generalizations of the Proportional method for claim problems:
the Proportional solution, the Weakly Proportional solution, the Proportional Nucleolus, and
$g$-solutions that generalize the Weighted Entropy solution.
We describe necessary and sufficient condition on $\mathcal{A}$ for inclusion the
Proportional Nucleolus in the Weakly Proportional solution and necessary and sufficient condition on
$\mathcal{A}$ for inclusion $g$-solution in the Weakly Proportional solution.
The necessary and sufficient condition on $\mathcal{A}$ for coincidence $g$-solution and the Weakly
Proportional solution and sufficient condition for coincidence all $g$-solutions and
the Proportional Nucleolus are obtained.
Keywords:
claim problem, cooperative games, proportional solution, weighted entropy, nucleolus.
Citation:
Natalia I. Naumova, “Generalized Proportional Solutions to Games with Restricted Cooperation”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5 (2012), 230–242
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm161 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v5/p230
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