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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2012, Volume 5, Pages 209–229 (Mi cgtm160)  
Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited

Pierre  von Mouchea, Federico Quartierib

a Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
b Università IULM, Via Carlo Bo 1, Milano, Italy
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Abstract: We revisit and compare equilibrium uniqueness results for homogeneous Cournot oligopolies. In doing this we provide various useful and interesting results for which it is difficult to give appropriate reference in the literature. We also propose problems for future research.
Keywords: Aggregative game, equilibrium (semi-)uniqueness, Fisher–Hahn conditions, marginal reduction, marginal revenue condition, oligopoly.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: Pierre  von Mouche, Federico Quartieri, “Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 5 (2012), 209–229
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{VonQua12}
\by Pierre~~von Mouche, Federico~Quartieri
\paper Equilibrium Uniqueness Results for Cournot Oligopolies Revisited
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2012
\vol 5
\pages 209--229
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm160}
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