|
Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2007, Volume 1, Pages 277–285
(Mi cgtm16)
|
|
|
|
Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences
Somdeb Lahiri Institute for Financial Management & Research,
Chennai, 600034, India
Abstract:
In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.
Citation:
Somdeb Lahiri, “Three-Sided Matchings and Separable Preferences”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 1 (2007), 277–285
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm16 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v1/p277
|
Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 112 | Full-text PDF : | 51 | References: | 31 |
|