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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2013, Volume 6, Pages 264–273
(Mi cgtm124)
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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
The Strategy of Tax Control in Conditions of Possible Mistakes and Corruption of Inspectors
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva St. Petersburg State University,
Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes,
Bibliotherapy pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
Abstract:
A generalization of the game-theoretical model of tax control
adjusted for possible corruption and inspectors mistakes is
considered. The hierarchical model has a three-level structure: at
the highest level of a hierarchy is an administration of tax
authority, in the middle is an inspector, subordinated to tax
administration, and at the lowest level are $n$ taxpayers. It is
supposed, that an interaction between risk-neutral players of
different levels of a hierarchy corresponds to scheme
“principal-to-agent”.
The model is studied for the case when the penalty is proportional
to the level of evasion. It is supposed that
a tax inspector may turn out a bribetaker or make ineffective tax audit,
i.e. make a mistake and don't reveal an existing tax evasion.
In the case of corruption a tax
control supposed to be effective, i.e. reveals existing tax evasions
always. As in previous models, it is supposed that fact of corruption is very difficult to reveal
and an inspector is punished only for negligent audit.
In the case of ineffective auditing it is assumed that the tax
inspector can mistake and miss an existing evasion with the
probability, which can be considered as a part of
negligent inspectors of their total number.
For every possible situation the players profit functions and
optimal strategies are found.
Keywords:
tax auditing, tax evasion, corruption, ineffective auditing.
Citation:
Suriya Sh. Kumacheva, “The Strategy of Tax Control in Conditions of Possible Mistakes and Corruption of Inspectors”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 6 (2013), 264–273
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm124 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v6/p264
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Abstract page: | 181 | Full-text PDF : | 73 | References: | 30 |
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