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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2013, Volume 6, Pages 231–247 (Mi cgtm121)  

Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production

Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaia

St. Petersburg State University, Faculty of Applied Mathematics and Control Processes, Bibliotechnaya pl. 2, St. Petersburg, 198504, Russia
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Abstract: A game-theoretic model of territorial environmental production under Cournot competition is studied. The process is modeled as cooperative differential game with coalitional structure. The Nash equilibrium in the game played by coalitions is computed and then the value of each coalition is allocated according to some given mechanism between its members. The numerical example is given.
Keywords: optimal control, nonlinear system, dynamic programming.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: Nadezhda V. Kozlovskaia, “Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 6 (2013), 231–247
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{Koz13}
\by Nadezhda~V.~Kozlovskaia
\paper Coalitional Solution in a Game Theoretic Model of Territorial Environmental Production
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2013
\vol 6
\pages 231--247
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm121}
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  • https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/cgtm/v6/p231
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