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Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 2013, Volume 6, Pages 146–164 (Mi cgtm114)  
Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games

Henk Folmera, Pierre von Moucheb

a Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Landleven 1, 9747 AD, Groningen, The Netherlands
b Wageningen Universiteit, Hollandseweg 1, 6700 EW, Wageningen, The Netherlands
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Abstract: We deal with the linkage of infinitely repeated games. Results are obtained by analysing the relations between the feasible individually rational payoff regions of the isolated games and the linked game. In fact we have to handle geometric problems related to Minkowski sums, intersections and Pareto boundaries of convex sets.
Keywords: asymmetries, convex set, feasible individually rational payoff region, Folk theorem, full cooperation, linking, Minkowski sum, Pareto boundary, tensor game.
Document Type: Article
Language: English
Citation: Henk Folmer, Pierre von Mouche, “Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games”, Contributions to Game Theory and Management, 6 (2013), 146–164
Citation in format AMSBIB
\Bibitem{FolVon13}
\by Henk~Folmer, Pierre~von Mouche
\paper Analysing the Folk Theorem for Linked Repeated Games
\jour Contributions to Game Theory and Management
\yr 2013
\vol 6
\pages 146--164
\mathnet{http://mi.mathnet.ru/cgtm114}
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