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Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 1985, Issue 9, Pages 118–127
(Mi at7553)
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This article is cited in 1 scientific paper (total in 1 paper)
Simulation of Behavior and Intelligence
One dynamic problem in voting theory. II
S. G. Novikov Moscow
Abstract:
The paper continues considering dynamic aspects in one of the problems of the voting theory, where two players participate in the choice of the subsequently proposed programs. It is shown that a set of finite cycles to which the game trajectories converge is determined by the position of the ideal players and one voter.
Received: 12.07.1984
Citation:
S. G. Novikov, “One dynamic problem in voting theory. II”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 1985, no. 9, 118–127; Autom. Remote Control, 46 (1985), 1168–1177
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at7553 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y1985/i9/p118
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