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This article is cited in 11 scientific papers (total in 11 papers)
Surveys
Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research
V. N. Burkov, A. K. Enaleev, N. A. Korgin Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow, 117997 Russia
Abstract:
We describe prerequisites for the emergence of the key concept of incentive compatibility in the theory of active systems and mechanism design and give a survey of approaches to this problem, which have led to stating the fair play and revelation principles, and of current trends in this branch of scientific knowledge. Potential difficulties and development prospects are discussed.
Keywords:
active system, mechanism design, incentive compatibility, fair play principle, revelation principle, strategy-proofness, active planing.
Citation:
V. N. Burkov, A. K. Enaleev, N. A. Korgin, “Incentive compatibility and strategy-proofness of mechanisms of organizational behavior control: retrospective, state of the art, and prospects of theoretical research”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2021, no. 7, 5–37; Autom. Remote Control, 82:7 (2021), 1119–1143
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at15742 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y2021/i7/p5
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Abstract page: | 242 | Full-text PDF : | 15 | References: | 32 | First page: | 21 |
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