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Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2011, Issue 3, Pages 145–160
(Mi at1495)
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Intellectual Control Systems
Power Index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota
M. V. Batsyn, V. A. Kalyagin State University, Higher School of Economics, Nizhni Novgorod Branch, Nizhni Novgorod, Russia
Abstract:
An axiomatics of power indices in voting with quota was proposed. It relies on the additivity and dictator axioms. Established was an important property that the player's power index is representable as the sum of contributions of the coalitions in which it is a pivot member. The coalition contributions are independent of the players' weights or the quota. The general theorem of power index representation and the theorem of representation for a power index of anonymous players were formulated and proved.
Citation:
M. V. Batsyn, V. A. Kalyagin, “Power Index axiomatics in the problem of voting with quota”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2011, no. 3, 145–160; Autom. Remote Control, 72:3 (2011), 600–614
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at1495 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y2011/i3/p145
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 253 | Full-text PDF : | 93 | References: | 41 | First page: | 8 |
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