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Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2005, Issue 3, Pages 113–120
(Mi at1346)
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This article is cited in 3 scientific papers (total in 3 papers)
Control in Social Economic Systems
Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games
D. A. Novikova, A. G. Chkhartishvilib a Trapeznikov Institute of Control Sciences, Russian Academy of Sciences, Moscow
b M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University
Abstract:
For the reflexive game where the agents' decisions rely on a hierarchy of beliefs about essential parameters, beliefs about beliefs, and so on, consideration was given to stability of its information equilibrium. Stability lies in that the expected result of the game is observed precisely by each participant, be it real and phantom, that is, existing in the belief of other real or phantom participants.
Citation:
D. A. Novikov, A. G. Chkhartishvili, “Stability of information equilibrium in reflexive games”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2005, no. 3, 113–120; Autom. Remote Control, 66:3 (2005), 441–448
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at1346 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y2005/i3/p113
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 305 | Full-text PDF : | 70 | References: | 41 | First page: | 1 |
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