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Avtomatika i Telemekhanika, 2005, Issue 2, Pages 108–114
(Mi at1328)
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This article is cited in 3 scientific papers (total in 3 papers)
Control in Social Economic Systems
Many-step two-person games with a fixed sequence of moves under aggregated information on partner's choice
V. S. Alieva, A. F. Kononenkob a Finance Academy under the Government of the Russian Federation
b Dorodnitsyn Computing Centre of the Russian Academy of Sciences
Abstract:
A many-step two-person game is studied with a fixed sequence of moves under aggregated information on every move at the decision making instant and on the choice of player 2 at the current move. Player 1, knowing this information at every step $i$, first chooses a strategy $\mathbf{x}_{i}(\cdot)=({\mathbf{x}}_{1}(\cdot),\dots,{\mathbf{x}}_{n}(\cdot))$, $i=\overline{1,n}$, and informs it for $n$ moves to player 2 at the beginning of the game. His maximal guaranteed result and the corresponding optimal ($\varepsilon$-optimal) strategy are determined. Such games under complete (nonaggregated) information are formulated and a compact expression for the strategy of player 1 is derived.
Citation:
V. S. Aliev, A. F. Kononenko, “Many-step two-person games with a fixed sequence of moves under aggregated information on partner's choice”, Avtomat. i Telemekh., 2005, no. 2, 108–114; Autom. Remote Control, 66:2 (2005), 265–271
Linking options:
https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at1328 https://www.mathnet.ru/eng/at/y2005/i2/p108
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Statistics & downloads: |
Abstract page: | 199 | Full-text PDF : | 68 | References: | 32 | First page: | 1 |
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